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IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS): BLOOD 
BANK LIABILITY? 
The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) can be con-
tracted via a blood transfusion. A legal question of growing importance in 
Maryland and across the country is whether a blood bank which supplies 
AIDS-tainted blood should be liable to a blood trans fusee for the contrac-
tion of AIDS. Inherent in that question is a balancing of society's need to 
protect blood banks from /lability and the individual's right of recovery. 
This comment examines that question. The author begins with a historical 
review of blood bank liability for blood tainted with viruses other than 
AIDS and then discusses various theories of liability under which a blood 
bank could be held liable for the transfer of AIDS-tainted blood. The 
comment concludes with a legislative proposal which would permit individ-
ual recovery for tranfusion-associated AIDS without interfering with soci-
ety's need for an adequate and safe supply of blood. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, a septuagenarian woman entered a California hospital to 
undergo a hip-replacement operation. As part of the hip-replacement 
procedure, the woman received a routine blood transfusion. The opera-
tion was successful, but the blood transfusion had tragic consequences. 
Three months after the operation, the woman began to feel weak and 
lethargic. The woman's condition was diagnosed initially as hepatitis. 1 
However, this diagnosis was reVised later to Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS), a disease that has been designated by the federal gov-
ernment as its "number one health priority."2 The woman contracted 
her AIDS as a result of tainted blood used for her blood transfusion dur-
ing her hip-replacement surgery. 
The issues that arise from this tragic occurrence are many, but the 
question addressed in this comment is whether there is any legal recourse 
for a victim of transfusion-associated AIDS. Specifically, the comment 
will assess the liability of a blood bank that collects, stores, and distrib-
utes tainted blood that eventually causes a blood transfusee to contract 
1. Press, AIDS Spreads to the Courts, NEWSWEEK, July l, 1985, at 61. 
2. THE FEDERAL REsPONSE TO AIDS- TwENTY-NINTH REPORT BY THE COMMIT-
TEE ON GOVERNMEI'<"T OPERATIONS TOGETHER WITH DISSENTING AND ADDI-
TIONAL VIEWS, H.R. REP. No. 582, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1983). See also AIDS 
Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1985, Health Section (Magazine), at 25 (Margaret M. Heckler, 
then Secretary of the Health and Human Services Department, stated that AIDS 
was the federal government's "number one health priority" because (1) "the number 
of reported AIDS cases was doubling every year. With that kind of exponential 
growth, it was clear that thousands of Americans would all-too-soon be affected by 
the disease," and (2) "AIDS leaves no survivors; it has been universally fatal."). 
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AIDS.3 Not discussed in this comment are the related issues of the liabil-
ity of an individual who negligently donates tainted blood,4 or of a phar-
maceutical company that manufactures medical products containing 
tainted blood. 5 
The comment begins with a discussion of the AIDS disease, and its 
national magnitude. Following that discussion, the causal link between 
blood banks and transfusion-associated AIDS is examined. The com-
ment then considers the similarities between AIDS and serum hepatitis 
to establish a foundation upon which the blood liability cases of the early 
1970's may be analogized to transfusion-associated AIDS cases. From 
that discussion, an examination of the law as it relates to blood bank 
liability will be presented. Following that, the comment will discuss the-
ories of recovery for transfusion-associated AIDS victims. Finally, the 
comment will impart some general suggestions on how the problem of 
transfusion-associated diseases should be handled by the legal system. 
II. AIDS: THE DISEASE 
AIDS is defined by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) as "a 
disease, at least moderately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immu-
nity, occurring in a person with no known cause for diminished resist-
ance to that disease. " 6 In layman's terms, AIDS is a disease that 
weakens and eventually destroys the body's immune system. Because 
AIDS renders the immune system ineffective, the body becomes suscep-
tible to a whole array of diseases. These diseases ravage the body and 
eventually cause death. 7 
The first cases of AIDS were identified in mid-1981.8 The origin of 
the disease was, and still is, unknown. 9 At first, only homosexuals and 
3. For the purpose of this comment, no distinction is made between commercial and 
non-profit blood banks because the doctrine of charitable immunity generally has 
been abrogated throughout the United States. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 895E (1980); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 133 (5th ed. 1984). See 
infra note 125, for information on the charitable immunity doctrine in Maryland. 
4. See Hubbell v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc.2d 847, 260 N.Y.S.2d 
539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sp. Term l965)(liability of an individual who negligently do-
nates tainted blood). 
5. See Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App.3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 
590 ( 1985) (liability of a pharmaceutical company for its blood-derived product con-
taining AIDS). 
6. Update on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, MOR-
TALITY AND MORBIDITY WEEKLY, Sept. 24, 1982, at 514. 
7. For general discussions on AIDS, see generally F. SIEGAL & M. SIEGAL, AIDS: 
THE MEDICAL MYSTERY (1983) [hereinafter SIEGAL]; AIDS, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 
1985, Health Section (Magazine); Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 
1985, at 40-47; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Ser-
vice, Facts About AIDS (August, 1985) [hereinafter Facts About AIDS]. 
8. Curran, Morgan; Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow, Dowdle [hereinafter cited as Curran], The 
Epidemiology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects, 229 SCIENCE 1352 
(Sept. 27, 1985); Facts About AIDS, supra note 7; SIEGAL, supra note 7, at 5. 
9. Like No Other Human Disease, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1985, Health Section (Maga-
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intravenous drug users were thought to be susceptible to AIDS.IO Later, 
recipients of blood transfusions and those who received blood products, 
e.g., hemophiliacs, were added to the list of those susceptible to AIDS. 11 
Finally, a comprehensive list of those at high risk of contracting AIDS 
was formulated. That list included homosexuals, intravenous drug users, 
Haitians, hemophiliacs, recipients of blood transfusions, and any sexual 
intimate of those in the high risk group. 12 
By January 13, 1986, 16,458 confirmed cases of AIDS were reported 
in the United States. 13 Of that number, 51% of the adults with AIDS 
and 59% of the children with AIDS had died. 14 In 1985 there was an 
89% increase in AIDS cases as compared with the 1984 figures. 15 Ac-
cording to forecasts by public health experts, the AIDS epidemic shows 
no sign of abating, and 1986 is almost certain to have twice as many new 
reported cases of AIDS as were reported in 1985.16 Furthermore, the 
CDC has reported that AIDS is spreading among heterosexuals who are 
not members of the high risk groupY It is evident, then, that AIDS is a 
serious health problem that is slowly, but steadily, increasing its non-
high risk victims as it extends into mainstream America. 18 
The potentially devastating impact of an uncontrolled AIDS epi-
demic has been recognized by the federal government as a major health 
concern. In October of 1984, Congress authorized the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to award grants "to public and non-profit 
entities for information and education programs on, and for the diagno-
sis, prevention, and control of, acquired immune deficiency syndrome."19 
zine) at 11 [hereinafter Like No Other Human Disease]("We don't know of its 
[AIDS] origin, but it probably came into man very recently ... "). But cf AIDS 
Called Punishment, Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1986, at All, col. 2 (Reverend Charles 
Stanley, President of the Nation's largest Protestant denomination, believes that 
God created AIDS to show displeasure with America's acceptance of the homosex-
ual lifestyle). 
10. Feorino, Jaffe, Palmer, Peterman, Francis, Kalyanaraman, Weinstein, Stoneburner, 
Alexander, Raevsky, Getchell, Warfield, Haverkos, Kilbourne, Nicholson, Curran 
[hereinafter Feorino], Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome, 312 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1293 (May 16, 1985). 
11. /d. 
12. SEIGAL, supra note 7, at 68-99 (1983); Curran, supra note 8, at 1352; Facts About 
AIDS, supra note 7. 
13. AIDS Cases in 1985 Exceed Total of All Previous Years, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1986, 
at A1, col. 4. 
* After this comment went to press, the CDC reported, as of Feb. 2, 1987, 30,396 





17. /d. (Approximately 4.6% of AIDS victims are heterosexuals. Of these 768 persons, 
182 are known to have had sexual contacts with a member of the AIDS high risk 
group). 
18. /d. (The number of heterosexuals contracting AIDS more than doubled in 1985 as 
compared to 1984). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 247c(d) (Supp. 1985). 
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In 1985, House and Senate Conferees approved $234.2 million for re-
search and related activities to combat AIDS.20 State governments also 
have recognized AIDS as a major health concern. In New York, Schools 
Chancellor Nathan Quinones announced that the state school system 
would begin educating its pupils on AIDS in February of 1986.21 In 
Maryland, former Governor Harry Hughes appointed a task force to 
study how Maryland should handle its AIDS crisis.22 
Because AIDS is incurable at the present time, prevention is the 
priority of health experts. 23 Pre-1984 preventive measures consisted pri-
marily of education programs aimed at those in high risk of contracting 
AIDS. These programs were designed to alert such individuals to the 
AIDS symptoms, warn them to eliminate, or at least decrease, sexual 
activities in places where multiple sexual contacts were frequent, warn 
them to eliminate sexual contacts with anonymous partners, warn them 
to refrain from intravenous drugs, and advance a policy of safe-sex by 
advocating the use of condoms whenever possible. 24 In 1984, convincing 
evidence was proffered that the human T -cell lymphotropic virus Type 
III (HTLV Ill), a retrovirus,25 was the cause of AIDS.26 Following 
20. Conferees Approve Funds to Fight AIDS, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1985, at A21. But cf 
Budget Watch, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1986, at A15, col. 2 (The Reagan administra-
tion cuts AIDS funding). 
21. AIDS Instruction for Students, Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1985, at AS, col. 2. 
22. Citing Rise in AIDS Cases, Hughes Names Task Force, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1985, 
at B12, col. 1. 
* After this comment went to press, the Governor's Task Force issued its report. See 
Governor's Task Force on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS and Mary-
land, Policy Guidelines and Recommendations (Dec. 1986). 
23. AIDS, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1985, Health Section (Magazine), at 3; Peterson, Screen-
ing Blood Donations for AIDS, FDA CONSUMER, May 1985, at 5-11 [hereinafter 
Peterson]; Curran, supra note 8. But cf Researchers Are Optimistic About New Drug 
for AIDS, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1985, at A13, col. 4 (A new drug called AL721 is a 
promising candidate for treating AIDS. AL 721 attacks the AIDS virus by breaking 
down the outer shell of the virus. With its shell broken, the AIDS virus cannot 
infect normal cells. Early test results of AL 721 found that the drug restored im-
mune system function to elderly people without any adverse side effects.); Human 
Blood Substitute Closer to Reality, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1985, at Al, col. 1 (Scien-
tists are reporting progress on creating a human blood substitute which could be 
used in surgery where donor blood is to be avoided. If such a substitute is created, 
then transfusion-associated AIDS can be prevented.). 
24. AIDS EDUCATION FUND WHITMAN-WALKER CLINIC, AIDS INFORMATION 
(1983); see also 42 U.S.C. § 247c(d) (Supp. 1985). This section reads, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] acting through the Direc-
tor of the Center of Disease Control, may make grants to public and non-
profit private entities for information and education programs on, and for 
the diagnosis, prevention and control of, acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome. (emphasis added) 
25. A retrovirus is a special strain of virus that has long been known to cause disease in 
animals, but only recently has been linked to human illness. Peterson, supra note 
23, at 6. The fact that the cause of AIDS is a retrovirus lends credence to the theory 
that AIDS had its origin in the African Green Monkey. For example, virologist 
Myron Essex of Harvard believes that AIDS had its origin in the African Green 
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that significant discovery, a test that positively identifies the presence of 
HTLV-III27 in human blood was developed,28 thereby allowing for a 
reliable diagnosis that the blood examined has been exposed to, if not 
infected by, the AIDS virus. 
III. AIDS AND BLOOD BANKS: THE CAUSAL 
CONNECTION 
Approximately three million Americans require blood transfusions 
or blood products annually.29 To satisfy this need, eight million Ameri-
cans donate approximately twelve million units of blood to blood 
banks. 30 Although it is not known how much AIDS tainted blood is 
currently in the blood banking system, approximately 227 blood trans-
fusees have contracted AIDS as a result of tainted blood.31 That blood is 
a conduit for the AIDS virus has been established conclusively. 32 Thus, 
blood banks are on the front line of the battle against the spread of AIDS 
from those in the high risk group to those not in high risk of contracting 
AIDS. 
The United States Public Health Service has advised those in high 
risk of contracting AIDS to refrain from donating blood.33 To further 
ensure a safer blood supply, the Public Health Service also has advised 
blood banks to scrutinize potential blood donors more carefully by way 
Monkey and that the disease spread to humans who live in close association with 
the monkeys. Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985 at 44. Robert 
Gallo, the director of the National Cancer Institute and the researcher who isolated 
HTLV-III, also believes that the African Green Monkey could have originated the 
AIDS virus. Like No Other Human Disease, supra note 9, at 11. 
26. Curran, supra note 8; Feorino, supra note 10. 
27. Silbemer, The Great AIDS Race: Testing the Test, 127 SCIENCE NEWS 36 (Jan. 19, 
1985) (article discussing the AIDS blood test); Leveraging AIDS, 135 FORBES 115 
(April 8, 1985) (article describing the scramble to produce a blood test for AIDS, 
and the attendant benefits of being the first to develop the test, namely, a $70 million 
market in the U.S. and a $100 million market overseas). 
28. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
29. R. ECKERT & E. WALLACE, SECURING A SAFER BLOOD SUPPLY: Two VIEWS, at 
3 (1985). 
30. ld. 
31. AIDS Cases In 1985 Exceed Total of All Previous Years, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1986, 
at Al col. 4 ("AIDS cases among recipients of blood transfusions continued to 
grow, more than tripling from 56 in 1984 to 171 in 1985"). 
32. Peterson, supra note 23, at 6 (AIDS has been linked with the transfusion of whole 
blood); Finkbeiner, AIDS: Just the Facts, JoHNS HOPKINS MAGAZINE, Dec. 1985, 
at 24 ("People who received transfusions with infected blood had the virus injected 
directly into their bloodstreams, as did hemophiliacs receiving clotting factor, a con-
centrate of hundreds of different blood donations."); Feorino, supra note 10, at 1293 
("Subsequent cases [of AIDS) in persons with hemophilia and recipients of blood 
transfusions confirmed a pattern of occurrence suggesting that the cause was a 
transmissible infectious agent."). 
33. Peterson, supra note 23, at 9. The U.S. Public Health Service stated: "It is vital to 
the safety of the blood supply that persons who are in groups at increased risk for 
AIDS continue to follow the U.S. Public Health Service recommendations and to 
voluntarily refrain from donating." 
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of increased screening. 34 With the discovery ofHTLV-111, a highly effec-
tive AIDS blood test was developed - the enzyme-linked immu-
nosorbent assay test (ELISA). The ELISA test detects the presence of 
HTLV -III in human blood.35 ELISA is 98.6% effective in its detection 
of AIDS. 36 However, when ELISA is coupled with another test, the 
Western blot analysis, a 100% detection rate exists.37 ELISA and the 
Western blot analysis do not show conclusively that an individual has 
AIDS; rather the tests indicate whether an individual has been exposed 
to the AIDS antibodies.38 Exposure, however, is enough to preclude the 
use of the exposed-donor's blood for transfusion purposes. Because 
blood banks and their blood are perhaps the most common route for 
heterosexual contraction of AIDS, the ELISA and Western blot analysis 
tests appear to be an effective method of eliminating the spread of AIDS 
via blood transfusions. 
IV. HOW AIDS RELATES TO SERUM HEPATITIS 
No court has ruled on the liability of a blood bank for a case of 
transfusion-associated AIDS that results from a blood bank's blood sup-
ply. Only a few such cases have been filed. 39 Owing to the lack of case 
law precedent, courts probably will analogize transfusion-associated 
34. I d. Prior to the present AIDS crisis, blood banks were required to maintain records 
and medical histories of donors based upon screening questions. See Mo. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 10 § 10.02.08 (1984) (repealed May 5, 1986 13:9 Md. Admin. Reg. 1030); 
AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS,. TECHNICAL METHODS AND PROCE-
DURES, 1-10 (6th ed. 1974). 
35. For an interesting article discussing the constitutional rights of HTL V-III carriers, 
see Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1274 
(1986). 
36. Weiss, Goedert, Sarngadharan, Bodner, Gallo, Blattner, AIDS Seroepidemiology 
Collaborative Working Group [hereinafter Weiss], Screening Test for HTLV-III 
(AIDS Agent) Antibodies: Specificity, Sensitivity, and Applications, 253 J. A.M.A. 2, 
221 (Jan. 11, 1985). "Excluding borderline ELISA ratios ... from analysis, the test 
is 98.6% specific and 97.3% sensitive for AIDS. If borderline ratios are considered 
negative, the test is 98.7% specific and 81.8% sensitive, whereas if borderline ratios 
are considered positive, the test is 92.6% specific and 97.7% sensitive." Jd. at 224. 
37. Id. at 224 ("In another study, using a combination of ELISA and Western blot 
analysis, 100% of patients with AIDS were found to have evidence of HTLV-111 
antibodies.") 
38. Peterson, supra note 23, at 6 ("The most important thing for donors to understand 
when they give blood is that the antibody test is not a test for AIDS, and that a 
positive test does not mean that the person definitely will develop AIDS."). Cf 
Perkins, Does Antibody Screening of Donors Increase the Risk of Transfusion-Associ-
ated AIDS!, 313 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 2, at 115 (July 11, 1985) 
(where a doctor expresses his concern that many persons who fear that they have 
AIDS will try and donate blood for the purpose of getting their blood tested). 
39. Va. Infant's Parents Sue Over Aids, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1986 at D7, col. 1 (the 
family of an infant who developed AIDS after receiving a blood transfusion filed 
suit against the American National Red Cross and Georgetown Hospital in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for $20 million); Kushnick 
v. Cedars Sinai Medical Center, No. WEC-84010 (L.A. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 7, 1985) 
(allegations of transfusion-associated AIDS). 
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AIDS cases to the case law dealing with transfusion-associated serum 
hepatitis.40 This analogy is appropriate due to the basic similarities be-
tween AIDS and serum hepatitis: both diseases are spread via blood41 
and both diseases have the same high risk group members -homosexu-
als, intravenous drug users, blood transfusees, and sexual partners of the 
infected.42 AIDS and serum hepatitis, however, have two major differ-
ences. First, AIDS is fatal while serum hepatitis can be treated success-
fully. Second, the detectibility rate for serum hepatitis, during the period 
of reported case law, was far less effective than is now possible for the 
detection of AIDS. When the majority of the transfusion-associated se-
rum hepatitis cases were decided, detectibility for serum hepatitis in 
human blood ranged from 0% to 30% effective.43 The current tests for 
AIDS in human blood are 100% effective.44 Although the similarities 
between AIDS and serum hepatitis justify analogizing one to the other, 
the significant differences, particularly in detectibility rates, should 
strongly militate for different legal outcomes. 
V. REVIEW OF THE BLOOD LIABILITY CASES 
The law relative to liability for tainted blood has its modern origin 
in the case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital. 45 In Perlmutter, the 
plaintiff, Gussie Perlmutter, sued Beth David Hospital for damages re-
sulting from transfusion-associated serum hepatitis. The plaintiff sued 
the hospital on an implied warranty of fitness theory and averred that the 
blood sold to her was "not fit or of merchantable quality," because it 
allegedly contained impurities that caused serum hepatitis.46 The Court 
of Appeals of New York held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of 
action cognizable under a warranty theory.47 
40. Miller, O'Connell, Leipold, Wenzel [hereinafter Miller] Potential Liability for 
Transfusion-Associated AIDS, 253 J. A.M.A. 23, 3420 (June 21, 1985). See Hyland 
Therapeutics v. Superior Ct., 175 Cal. App.3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985) 
(where the Court of Appeals of California analogized a case dealing with a blood 
product tainted with AIDS to cases dealing with serum hepatitis). 
41. R. EcKERT & E. WALLACE, supra note 29, at 9-12 (for serum hepatitis being spread 
by blood transfusions); see supra note 32 (for AIDS being spread by blood 
transfusions). 
42. Miller, supra note 40 (for serum hepatitis high risk group); see supra note 12 and 
accompanying text (for AIDS high risk group). 
43. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (no 
method for the detection of serum hepatitis in human blood); Fisher v. Sibley Me-
morial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979) (test for detection of serum hepatitis in 
human blood is anywhere from 30% to 70% effective). Cf. R. ECKERT & E. W AL-
LACE, supra note 29, at 104 (By 1980, the detection test for serum hepatitis in 
human blood was over 90% effective.). 
44. See supra note 37. 
45. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). 
46. 308 N.Y. at 103, 123 N.E.2d at 793. 
47. 308 N.Y. at 107-108, i23 N.E.2d at 796. It is interesting to note that the New York 
Supreme Court at Special Term, 128 N.Y.S.2d 176 (1953) and the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court, 283 A.D. 784, 129 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1954), held that Ms. 
Perlmutter had stated a cognizable warranty action against Beth David Hospital. 
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The court's decision was predicated on a sales/service dichotomy. 
The court concluded that the blood transfusion, including the sale of 
blood, was a service to which no implied warranty could attach.48 The 
court reasoned that the hospital was devoted primarily to the cure of the 
sick and its contract with the plaintiff was to make available the skill and 
materials to restore her health. The supplying of the blood for the plain-
tiff's transfusion was "entirely subordinate to [the hospital's] paramount 
function of furnishing trained personnel and specialized facilities in an 
endeavor to restore plaintiff's health."49 The court concluded that the 
sale or furnishing of the blood by the hospital was only an "incidental 
and very secondary adjunct" feature of the services to be performed by 
the hospital. 50 The Perlmutter conclusion, that blood is part of a service 
and thus a service, was, and is, the basis for denying warranty recovery in 
blood transfusion litigation. The Perlmutter conclusion also had the ef-
fect of denying recovery in strict liability for victims of transfusion-asso-
ciated serum hepatitis. The reason for this denial of recovery is that only 
a product is actionable under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
(1980). 51 Because supplying blood was deemed to be a service and strict 
liability only applies to the sale of products, courts have held § 402A 
strict liability to be inapposite in transfusion-associated serum hepatitis 
cases. 52 
48. 308 N.Y. at 108, 123 N.E.2d at 796. Cf Napoli v. St. Peters Hosp. of Brooklyn, 213 
N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (upholding a cause of action for an express war-
ranty that blood was fit.) 
49. 308 N.Y. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795. 
50. /d. 
51. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1980): 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for 
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered 
into any contractual relationship with the seller. 
52. Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 351 So.2d 351 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (blood is a 
service and not a commodity and thus strict liability does not apply); Heirs of Fruge 
v. Blood Services, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (blood is not a product, rather it is a 
service to which strict liability does not apply); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hosp. 
Inc., 33 Cal. App.3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973) (blood is a service to which no 
warranty or strict liability recovery is applicable). Contra Reilly v. King County 
Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971) (blood has all the 
attributes of a sale, thus blood is a product to which strict liability applies); Rostocki 
v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, 276 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1973) (blood is a product 
intended for human consumption); In re Community Blood Bank of Kansas City 
Area, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 17,728 at 23,010 
(F.T.C. 1966) (the F.T.C. held that blood was a product of commerce over which it 
had regulatory jurisdiction), rev'd on other grounds, Community Blood Bank of 
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Since the Perlmutter decision, the sales/service dichotomy has been 
the threshold consideration in transfusion-associated serum hepatitis 
cases. Consistent with Perlmutter, courts have defined blood as a service 
and therefore have denied recovery under warranty and strict liability for 
the victims of transfusion-associated serum hepatitis. The Perlmutter de-
cision, however, has not escaped its share of disapproval. It has been 
criticized by commentators53 and a few courts. 54 The commentators 
have criticized Perlmutter for rendering a policy decision masked by the 
veil of the sales/service dichotomy. The criticism is that the Perlmutter 
court realized that blood and its abundant availability was iniportant to 
society, but rather than stating that liability for transfusion-associated 
serum hepatitis cases would have the socially unacceptable effect of put-
ting blood banks out of business as a consequence of large adverse judg-
ments, the New York court justified its policy decision by resorting to the 
legalism of the sales/service dichotomy. 55 
Courts criticizing the Perlmutter decision have done so on the same 
basis. For example, the District Court of Appeals of Florida stated in 
Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 56 that "it seems to us a distor-
tion to take what is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a 
service, and then employ this transformed material in erecting the frame-
work of a major policy decision. " 57 Similarly, the Court of Appeals of 
Washington held in Reilly v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc., that 
a blood transfusion involved the sale of blood because the blood used in a 
transfusion had attributes of a sale. 58 According to Reilly, a blood trans-
fusion consists of a property transfer through the consent of competent 
parties for a consideration in money paid, or to be paid. 59 The general 
Kansas City Area, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 
1969). 
53. See, e.g., Note, Wa"anty-Implied Wa"anty of Quality Held Not Applicable to Blood 
Furnished by Hospital to Patient, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955); Note, Sales-Im-
plied Wa"anties-Actionfor Breach of Implied Wa"anties of Quality Not Maintain-
able Against Hospital That Furnished Impure Blood to Patient, 69 IIARV. L. REv. 
391 (1955); Note, Sales: Implied Warranty: Blood Transfusions, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 
104 (1965). 
54. Reilly v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 
(1971). Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1966), aff'd as modified, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Cunningham v. MacNeal Me-
morial Hosp., 113 Ill. App.2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), aff'd as modified, 47 
111.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). 
55. See, Boland, Strict Liability In Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARK. 
L. REV. 236, 247 (1969) (where Professor Boland states that the Perlmutter court 
justified its policy decision by resorting to a "kind nonunderstanding nonsense, in 
awkwardly averring that a sale is not a sale ... "). 
56. 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd as modified, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 
1967). For a further elaboration of this case, see infra notes 64-68 and accompany-
ing text. 
57. 185 So.2d at 752. 
58. Reilly v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 
(1971). 
59. 6 Wash. App. at 175, 492 P.2d at 248. 
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criticism of the Perlmutter decision, therefore, has been that the Perlmut-
ter court categorized blood as a service in order to provide a legal basis of 
protection for the important blood industry against claims premised on 
implied warranty or strict liability. 
The Perlmutter decision, and the later courts which adopted its 
sales/service dichotomy, ignored the underlying justification for the de-
nial of recovery in a transfusion-associated serum hepatitis case. Implicit 
in the Perlmutter decision, however, was the court's recognition that the 
non-detectibility of serum hepatitis in blood required that the danger of 
tainted blood reaching a transfusee be balanced against putting blood 
banks out of business as a consequence of excessive adverse judgments. 60 
Because excessive adverse judgments against blood banks for non-detecti-
ble blood defects conceivably could destroy the blood banking industry, 
the court implicitly concluded that the small risk of serum hepatitis in 
blood should be borne by the transfusee. Preserving the blood banking 
industry by way of this risk shifting advanced the important policy of 
maintaining an adequate and ready supply of blood for the betterment of 
society. In essence, then, the Perlmutter court employed the sales/ser-
vice dichotomy as the "framework of a major policy decision."61 
The Perlmutter sales/service dichotomy, however, was formulated 
in a situation involving a suit against a hospital, not a blood bank. Most 
courts have employed Perlmutter in a hospital transfusion-associated se-
rum hepatitis liability case,62 only a few courts have extended Perlmutter 
to suits against a blood bank in a transfusion-associated serum hepatitis 
case. 63 The rationale behind this disparate treatment is that blood banks 
play a different role than hospitals in the blood transfusion process. Hos-
pitals generally perform the blood transfusion itself. The activities of the 
blood bank, in contrast, generally resemble the activities of a supplier of 
goods. That is, blood banks solicit, collect, store, and sell or furnish their 
product -blood - to hospitals, who in tum perform the actual transfu-
sions. It was because of the blood bank's similarity to a supplier that the 
Florida court in Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russe/1 64 refused to ap-
ply Perlmutter in a suit involving a blood bank, thus becoming the first 
court to refuse to apply Perlmutter in a suit against a blood bank. 
In Community Blood Bank, the plaintiff contracted serum hepatitis 
from a blood transfusion administered to her while in a Florida hospital. 
60. See 308 N.Y. at 106-7, 123 N.E.2d at 795. 
61. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
62. See, e.g., Fisher v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979); Lovett v. 
Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961). 
63. Goetz v. J.K. and Suise L. Waldey Research Inst. and Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Koening v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis.2d 324, 
127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 
402 P.2d 584 (1965); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 
270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965). 
64. 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), a.ff'd as modified, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 
1967). 
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The plaintiff decided not to bring an action against the hospital, rather 
the plaintiff sued the blood bank which had supplied the blood for her 
transfusion. The defendant blood bank moved to dismiss the claim, rely-
ing on Perlmutter.65 The Florida trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion, but the Florida District Court of Appeals, Second District, 
reversed.66 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the judgment of the 
Second District Court of Appeals with respect to the fact that the plain-
tiff had stated a cause of action. 67 The concurring opinion, by Florida 
Supreme Court Justice Roberts, laid the foundation for the subsequent 
assaults on the Perlmutter decision. Justice Roberts stated: 
A transaction whereby a blood bank, which is engaged in the 
business of collecting and distributing blood, transfers the title 
to the commodity to a patient for a consideration, is unques-
tionably a 'sale' . . . . Nor can it be questioned that the com-
modity in question - blood supplied for the purpose of a blood 
transfusion - is a product 'intended for human consumption' 
quite as much as is a vaccine, or a food product; and it is well 
settled in this jurisdiction that the manufacturer or producer of 
a product intended for human consumption or intimate body 
use is held strictly liable, without fault, for consequential inju-
ries to a consumer or user resulting from a defect in such prod-
uct.68 (citations omitted) 
By expressly holding that blood is a product, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida paved the way for warranty and strict liability recovery against blood 
banks for transfusion-associated diseases. 
Although Community Blood Bank set the attack on Perlmutter in 
motion, it was the case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital 69 
that sent blood industry lobbyists scurrying to their legislatures for pro-
tection from Cunningham's radical departure from Perlmutter. In Cun-
ningham, the plaintiff, Francis Cunningham, received several blood 
transfusions at MacNeal Memorial Hospital. She later contracted serum 
hepatitis and required additional hospitalization. 7° Cunningham filed 
suit against the hospital alleging strict liability because the hospital "sold 
and supplied" her blood that was "defective and in an unreasonably dan-
gerous condition and was in that condition at the time it left the hands of 
the defendant."71 Relying on Perlmutter, MacNeal Hospital moved to 
dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. MacNeal Hospital averred that the 
plaintiff erroneously was seeking to state a cause of action "against the 
65. 196 So.2d at 117. 
66. 185 So.2d at 755-56. 
67. 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967) (Roberts, J., concurring specially). 
68. 196 So.2d at 118-19. 
69. 113 Ill. App.2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969), aff'd as modified, 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 
N.E.2d 897 (1970). 
70. 113 Ill. App.2d at 75, 251 N.E.2d at 733. 
71. 113 Ill. App.2d at 75-76, 251 N.E.2d at 733. 
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defendant upon the theory that blood is a product, that such product was 
furnished in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition and that 
by reason thereof defendant is strictly liable to plaintiff for her alleged 
damages."72 MacNeal Hospital further stated that such a claim was to-
tally repugnant to the established precedents based upon Perlmutter. 
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Court of 
Illinois reversed, relying on Community Blood Bank, and stated that to 
"take a sale and twist it into a service is a distortion. " 73 The appellate 
court held that both MacNeal Hospital and the blood bank that supplied 
the tainted blood could be liable. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, MacNeal reasserted its 
Perlmutter argument, coupled with an argument that had its basis in 
comment (k) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.74 Comment 
(k) essentially recognizes the societial importance of some products. 75 
Comment (k) states that there are some products which are incapable of 
being made completely safe for their intended use, but because their use 
is important to society, public policy favors their use. An example of 
such a product is the Pasteur treatment for rabies which can lead to seri-
ous and damaging consequences when used. However, public policy fa-
vors the use of the product because the risk of adverse consequences is 
generally slight. Therefore, the risk of the product's dangerous conse-
quences is to be borne by the consumer, because the product, according 
to comment (k), is neither "defective" nor "unreasonably dangerous" if 
properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings.76 
MacNeal Hospital, by asserting the comment (k) argument, recog-
nized the developing trend that blood was indeed a product. However, 
MacNeal qualified its concession that blood was a product by stating that 
it was a product incapable of being made safe. Hence, MacNeal argued 
that § 402A strict liability did not attach to blood because blood was 
"incapable of being safe" from serum hepatitis because serum hepatitis 
could not be detected in blood with any certainty. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, rejected MacNeal Hospi-
tal's assertions, held that the providing of the blood was a sale, and ex-
72. 113 Ill. App.2d at 76, 251 N.E.2d at 734. 
73. 113 Ill. App.2d at 85, 251 N.E.2d at 738. 
74. 47 Ill.2d at 447-451, 266 N.E. 2d at 900, 903-4. 
75. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment K (1980): 
76. /d. 
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the 
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe 
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the 
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur 
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and 
damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invaria-
bly leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vac-
cine are fully justified. . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and 
accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous .... 
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tended § 402A to cover both hospitals and blood banks in the realm of 
transfusion-associated diseases. In reference to MacNeal's comment (k) 
argument, the court held that comment (k) only applied to products that 
were not impure and which, even if properly prepared, involved a sub-
stantial risk of injury to the user. Because the blood that caused Cun-
ningham's illness was impure, comment (k) was not applicable.77 
Therefore, the Cunningham court expressly rejected Perlmutter and held 
that hospitals and blood banks were strictly liable for tainted blood that 
results in a transfusion-associated disease. 78 
Cunningham was criticized for its narrow reading of comment (k).79 
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico, in Hines v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 80 
summarized this criticism: 
[the] Cunningham court, by categorically limiting the applica-
bility of [comment (k)] to 'pure' products stultified the flexible 
policy behind the exception. Instead of a balancing of the dan-
gers of a particular product against its benefits, Cunningham 
would categorize a large segment of products as vulnerable to 
strict liability without regard to social benefits. 81 
The gist of this criticism is that a product, such as blood, which is highly 
beneficial to society should not be labeled "unreasonably dangerous" 
within the meaning of § 402A unless a reliable test is available to detect 
and remove the dangers from that product. Even in the face of this criti-
cism, some courts began to adopt Cunningham and. reject Perlmutter. 82 
Fearing a nationwide collapse of their Perlmutter immunity, the 
blood industry lobbied state legislatures to codify Perlmutter and thus 
render void court decisions like Community Blood Bank and Cunning-
ham. A majority of the state legislatures did so. 83 A typical codification 
77. 47 Ill.2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 900. 
78. 47 Ill.2d at 457-58, 266 N.E.2d at 904. 
79. See, e.g., Note, Tons- Strict Liability- Strict Liability in Ton Held Applicable in 
Suit by Patient Against Hospital for Injuries Received from Transfusion of Defective 
Blood, 24 VAND. L. REV. 645, 653 (1971); Note, Products Liability- Hospital Blood 
Bank - Restatement of Torts§ 402A - Transfusion of Blood Which Contains Hepatitis 
Virus Is A Sale and Hospital is Strictly Liable in Ton for Resultant Injury to Patient, 
16 VILL. L. REV. 983, 1002-3 (1971); Note, Liability for Serum Hepatitis In Blood 
Transfusions, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 597-98 (1971). 
80. 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d 1075, cert. denied, 87 N.M. Ill, 529 P.2d 1232 (1974). 
81. 86 N.M. at 768, 527 P.2d at 1077. 
82. See Reilly v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 
246 (1971); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972), 
rev'd, 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1973), aff'd, 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 
(1975); Belle Bonfil's Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978) 
(en bane). 
83. ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.02.316(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1481 (1976); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1608 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Supp. 1985); CAL HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE§ 1606 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986); CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 13-22-104(2) 
(1973 & Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 19a-280 (West 1986); DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (Revised 1974); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 28:2-314 (1984) (this is 
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of Perlmutter, generally referred to as a blood immunity statute, reads, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not 
be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement, process-
ing, distribution, or use of ... whole blood, plasma, blood prod-
ucts, or blood derivatives. Such ... whole blood, plasma, blood 
products or blood derivatives shall not be considered commodi-
ties subject to sale or barter, and the ... transfusion or other 
transfer of such substances into the human body shall be con-
sidered a medical service. 84 
Thus, after a decade and half of change, the legislatures returned to the 
Perlmutter sales/service dichotomy as the grounds upon which transfu-
sion-associated disease cases were to be decided. In so doing, most of the 
legislatures completely ignored the policy underlying the denial of liabil-
ity in a transfusion-associated serum hepatitis case. 85 That is, because 
serum hepatitis was undetectible in human blood, the enormous social 
benefit of an ample and ready supply of blood far exceeded the slight risk 
of a transfusee contracting serum hepatitis via a blood transfusion. The 
the general implied warranty section which was interpreted in Fisher v. Sibley Me-
morial Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979), to preclude implied warranty recovery in 
tranfusion-associated serum hepatitis litigations); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) 
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN.§ 11-2-316(5) (1982 & Supp. 1986); HAWAII 
REV. STAT. §§ 325-91, 327-51 (Rep!. Vol. 1976); IDAHO CODE§ 39-3702 (1980 & 
Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, §§ 5101, 5102, 5103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-7-2 (Bums Repl. Vol. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 142A.8 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 65-3701 (1985); KY. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 139.125 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2797 (West Supp. 
1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (Supp. 1985-86); Mo. HEALTH-GEN-
ERAL CODE ANN.§ 18-402 (1982 & Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, 
§ 2-316(5) (West Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 333.10108 (West Supp. 
1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.928 (West 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 
(1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 431.069 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 50-
33-102 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. 71-4001 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (Rep!. Vol. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26:2A-7 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 24-10-5 (Repl. Pamphlet 1981 & 
Supp. 1985); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAWS § 580(4) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1986); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (Cum. Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-
33(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Page 1976 & Supp. 
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.300 
(Rep!. Part 1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CoDE 
ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 
(Revision 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Repl. Vol. 1979); TEX. CJV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§§ 77.001-.004 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 26-
31-1 (Repl. Vol. 1984); VA. CODE§ 32.1-297 (Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN.§ 70.54.120 (1975); W.VA. CODE§ 16-23-1 (Repl. Vol. 1979); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 146.31 (Supp. Pamp. 1986). 
84. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Rep!. Vol. 1979). 
85. Some states have given policy justifications for their blood immunity statutes, but 
have nonetheless relied upon the Perlmutter service definition of blood. See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT.§ 13-22-104(1) (1973 & Supp. 1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. Ill 1/ 
2,§ 5101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.002 
(Vernon 1986). 
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denial of liability in a few cases eliminated the possibility that excessive 
adverse judgments would force blood banks out of business. The legisla-
tures, instead of stating an express policy justification for the denial of 
liability, retreated into the Perlmutter legalism at the expense of the basic 
public policy consideration underlying § 402A strict liability. Justice 
Traynor, in his famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 86 
identified that policy concern: 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands 
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively re-
duce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective prod-
ucts that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer 
can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence 
of others, as the public cannot. 87 
Courts, unlike most of the legislatures, understood that policy con-
cern. One court decision stressed that if the basic policy considerations 
of strict liability were found to be present in a blood liability case, then 
strict liability would be applied "regardless of whether such activity by 
... [the] defendant [blood bank] be characterized as a sale or service."88 
Thus, the public policy concern of strict liability favors that the product 
manufacturers bear the risks and costs of injuries that result from prod-
ucts. The blood immunity statutes, however, place the risks upon the 
consumers in contravention of the public policy concern of strict prod-
ucts liability. 
VI. BLOOD IMMUNITY STATUTES: A CLOSER LOOK 
The general reaction to Cunningham, as discussed above, was the 
enactment of blood immunity statutes by a majority of state legisla-
tures. 89 In general, these statutes expressly state that any activity dealing 
with blood is a service upon which warranty and strict liability do not 
attach. 90 In essence, the state legislatures codified the Perlmutter 
decision. 
Although it might have seemed that these statutes would have re-
solved the Perlmutter type transfusion-associated disease cases, they did 
not. Plaintiffs continued to bring suits with the strategy of attacking the 
blood immunity statutes. Most of these attacks could have been avoided 
86. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
87. 24 Cal.2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 439-40; cf Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367 (1965) (where Judge 
Traynor stated that § 402A would not impose strict liability on unavoidably unsafe 
products. Judge Traynor characterized blood as a "classic example" of an unavoid-
ably unsafe product.). 
88. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J. Super. 331, 317 A.2d 392 (1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 
448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975). 
89. See supra note 83. See also AIDS Suits Focus on Blood Safeguards, Wall Street 
Journal, Aug. 20, 1984, § 2, at 17, col.2. 
90. See supra notes 83-84. 
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had the state legislatures expressly adopted the public policy rationale of 
preserving an adequate supply of blood as the basis of their legislation, 
rather than the strained Per/mutter-type service categorization. 
The first attacks on the blood immunity statutes were on constitu-
tional grounds.91 For example, in McAllister v. American National Red 
Cross,92 the plaintiff alleged that the Georgia blood immunity statute was 
unconstitutional under the Georgia and United States Constitutions.93 
McAllister's claim under the Georgia Constitution was that the blood 
immunity statute violated the provision which forbade the issuance of 
special laws that were contrary to general laws. 94 The plaintiff argued 
that the Georgia law constituted a special law because it exempted manu-
facturers of blood from the general law of strict products liability. The 
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the blood immunity statute was a 
general law because it operated uniformly throughout Georgia in spite of 
the fact that it excepted blood manufacturers from liability.95 Further, 
the court held that because the blood immunity statute applied uniformly 
to a specific class of affected persons, and had a reasonable general effect 
on those persons, the law was a general law.96 Hence, plaintiff's state 
constitutional attack failed. McAllister's federal constitutional claim was 
predicated upon the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 97 While McAllister claimed that the statute abridged his 
rights as a national citizen, he neglected to aver those abridged rights. 
Consequently, the court refused to invalidate the statute under the privi-
leges and immunities clause. Thus, the Georgia court, like other courts 
which faced similar constitutional claims, upheld the blood immunity 
statute as constitutional.9s 
Following the failure of the constitutional attacks, a new litigation 
91. See McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), 
aff'd, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972) (the Tennessee blood immunity statute does not 
violate equal protection or due process); Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, 365 F. 
Supp. 1344 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975) (Louisiana law 
extinguishing all causes of action except negligence against blood banks does not 
violate due process); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. of Louisiana , 333 So.2d 
354 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (Louisiana blood immunity statute does not violate Louisi-
ana Constitution.) 
92. 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977). 
93. 240 Ga. at 248, 240 S.E.2d at 249. 
94. /d. GA CONST. art. I, § II. 
~ VII stated in pertinent part: 
"Laws of general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the 
State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision 
has been made by an existing general law." 
95. 240 Ga. at 248-249, 240 S.E.2d at 249. 
96. /d. 
97. 240 Ga. at 249, 240 S.E.2d at 250. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1, states in pertinent 
part: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States." 
98. 240 Ga. ·at 249, 240 S.E.2d at 250. See supra note 91 for court decisions where 
blood immunity statutes were upheld as constitutional. 
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strategy was adopted. Plaintiffs attempted to limit the blood immunity 
statutes to their express and plain language. As noted, a majority of the 
blood immunity statutes state that blood and blood related activities are 
deemed to be services.99 Because of this definition, warranty liability 
does not attach to blood and blood related activities. Plaintiffs, then, 
conceded that the statutes denied them warranty recovery. However, the 
plaintiffs asserted that the statutes, in their plain language, did not fore-
close strict liability recovery. Like the constitutional challenges, these 
attacks failed because the courts, acting in a legislative role, looked be-
yond the plain language of the statute and ruled against strict liability 
recovery based upon public policy. That is, the courts stated that the 
societal benefits of an adequate supply of blood outweighed the risk that 
some blood tainted with serum hepatitis would infect a blood 
transfusee. 100 
The critical question, however, remains: Do the blood immunity 
statutes limit all liability and thus effectively immunize the blood indus-
try? The answer depends upon the language and scope of the blood im-
munity statute in question. 
Generally, the statutes have not foreclosed liability in the area of 
blood bank negligence and willful infliction of harm. But the solace con-
tained in the fact that the blo~d industry is not immunized completely 
quickly evaporates when the intricate nature of proving negligence in a 
transfusion-associated disease case is considered. 101 Furthermore, the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is unavailable in transfusion-associated se-
rum hepatitis cases. 102 The doctrine is inapplicable because it requires a 
99. See supra note 84 and accompanying text for language of a representative blood 
immunity statute. 
100. See McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 352 F. Supp. 690 (W.O. Tenn. 1971), 
a./f'd, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1972) (while the Tennessee law is couched in language 
of warranty, the intent was to preclude all liability except negligence); Shepard v. 
Alexian Brothers Hosp. Inc., 33 Cal. App.3d 606, 612, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 
(1973) ("[f]here is a strong public policy in favor of promoting an adequate supply 
of blood. Notwithstanding the danger from latent hepatitis virus, blood transfu-
sions result in a significant net gain in lives."); Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 
352 So.2d 351 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (the public policy of the Louisiana blood immu-
nity statute recognizes the lifesaving need for blood and thus strict liability as 
grounds for recovery will be denied.) 
101. See Sussman, Blood Transfusion Accidents, 1 TRAUMA 5, 86 (1960); 2 GRAY, AT-
TORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, 38.34-35 (1984); COURT ROOM MEDICINE-
VOLUME 3B DEATH, Blood Transfusion Reactions for Blood Transfusion Problems, 
§ 25.21 (1985). For cases dealing with negligence in transfusion-associated defect 
cases see Morse v. Riverside Hosp., 44 Ohio App.2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846 (1974) 
(hepatitis); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. of Louisiana, 333 So.2d 354 (La. 
Ct. App. 1976) (hepatitis); Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La. Ct. 
App. 1979) (transfused-malaria). 
102. See Schmaltz v. St. Luke's Hosp., 33 Colo. App.351,521 P.2d 787 (1974), rev'd in 
part, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975) (en bane) (Supreme Court of Colo-
rado affirmed, lower court's decision concerning res ipsa loquitur); Morse v. River-
side Hosp., 44 Ohio App. 2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846 (1974); Joseph v. Dr. W. H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 10 Utah2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1961). 
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presumption of negligence. Because serum hepatitis cannot be effectively 
detected in blood, a presumption that a blood bank was negligent cannot 
be drawn solely from the fact that the transfusee received a blood trans-
fusion that later resulted in serum hepatitis. 103 
Absent the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff is relegated to 
proving negligence without the aid of a res ipsa presumption. Such a 
proof is very difficult because the blood banking industry is heavily regu-
lated by local and state health departments that issue many regulations 
and procedures to ensure safe blood collection, storage, and sale. 104 To 
prove negligence, then, a plaintiff must show a deviation from these regu-
lations which, in many cases, is virtually impossible because of the pro-
fessionalism of blood banks. Further, blood banks tend to adhere rigidly 
to the regulatory procedures in order to protect the integrity of their 
business and their licensure status. Finally, a negligence action for trans-
fusion-associated serum hepatitis is compounded by the fact that serum 
hepatitis is not effectively detectible in human blood. Thus, if a blood 
bank properly screens potential donors but serum hepatitis is neverthe-
less found in the bank's blood, it is not because the blood bank was negli-
gent, rather it is due to the unavailability of an effective test for detecting 
serum hepatitis in human blood. Given these difficulties, it seems that 
the state legislatures have effectively immunized the blood banking in-
dustry from liability for transfusion-associated serum hepatitis by limit-
ing liability to negligence. los 
All blood immunity statutes are not, however, identical in language 
and scope. A few states deny warranty and strict liability for a transfu-
sion-associated virus only if the virus in the human blood cannot be de-
tected or removed by the reasonable use of scientific procedures or 
techniques. 106 In the states of Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, Michigan, Montana and Virginia liability in a transfusion-associ-
ated virus suit is not based solely on a codification of Perlmutter. Rather, 
liability is dependent upon the detectibility of the virus or defect in the 
human blood. 107 These states have created a hybrid warranty scheme. 
That is, if a test is available for effective detection of a blood virus or 
defect, the blood bank will lose its immunity as to that virus or defect, 
and will be liable in warranty and strict liability for that defect. In es-
sence, if a scientifically validated test is available to detect a virus or de-
103. See Schmaltz, supra note 102. 
104. See Tufaro v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 368 So.2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (dealing 
with interviewing blood donors and two blood bank regulators - the American 
Association of Blood Banks and the National Institute of Health); Morse v. River-
side Hosp., 44 Ohio App.2d 422, 339 N.E.2d 846 (1974) (discussing regulatory 
measures and negligence). See also Mo. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 10, § 10.02 (1986) (for 
Maryland blood bank regulations). 
105. For cases where a negligence cause of action failed in a transfusion-associated defect 
suit, see supra note 101. 
106. The states include: Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Michigan, Mon-
tana, and Virginia. For the statutory citations see supra note 83. 
107. Id. 
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feet in a blood sample, then the blood bank will be negligent per se if any 
of its tainted blood causes an injury that should have been detected. Neg-
ligence exists even if the blood bank used the test because it is presumed 
the "effective" test was administered negligently. Until this act of negli-
gence occurs, no warranty action can be maintained. Absent the war-
ranty action, there can be no strict liability action. Thus, in order to 
invoke the contract theory of warranty, one initially must invoke the tort 
theory of negligence. Once the tort theory is invoked, the contract the-
ory will attach, which in turn, will activate the theory of strict liability. 
Under these detectibility statutes, an individual essentially bas a new 
form of action predicated upon negligence. That action, because it is 
based upon statutory language, aptly may be called the "positive-tort" 
theory of recovery. 10s 
A short hypothetical will aid in the understanding of how the posi-
tive-tort theory operates. Plaintiff receives a blood transfusion from de-
fendant blood bank. Plaintiff then contracts a virus from the transfusion 
and establishes a causal connection between the virus and the blood 
bank's blood. If the virus in question is detectible by a scientifically vali-
dated test, the blood bank has committed an act of negligence either by 
not using the test or by using the test in a negligent fashion. Plaintiff, 
because of defendant's negligence, is now permitted to claim a warranty 
or strict liability theory of recovery against the blood bank for damages 
incurred as a result of the transfusion-associated virus. 
If the virus contracted by the plaintiff is undeteetible, then no negli-
gence exists and, consequently, there is no cognizable claim of recovery 
in warranty or in strict liability. Hence, the positive-tort theory recog-
nizes the important public policy of blood availability by immunizing 
blood banks from warranty and strict liability recovery when a defect is 
undetectible. However, in a detectibility situation, the individual rights 
of the victim will be advanced by allowing the use of warranty and strict 
liability recovery. Therefore, the positive-tort theory provides a balance 
between the conflicting interests of individual rights to recovery versus 
society's need for an abundant blood supply. The balance achieved pro-
tects blood availability by denying warranty and strict liability recovery 
for non-detectible defects. Individual rights are protected by allowing 
warranty and strict liability recovery for detectible defects. This balanc-
ing provides for a safer blood supply and a more equitable allocation of 
risks in the realm of blood transfusions. Under the positive-tort theory, 
the blood transfusee does not bear all the risks as do transfusees under 
the Perlmutter codifications. 
108. The basic idea for the detectibility statutes having a so-called "hybrid" form of im-
plied warranty recovery was stated by Judge Spector of the Florida District Court of 
Appeals in Williamson v. Memorial Hosp. of Bay County, 307 So.2d 199, 201 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("In essence, the legislature has created a hybrid form of im-
plied warranty and by invoking what courts refer to as its infinite legislative wis-
dom, that body has made a legal concept ordinarily congnizable in the law of sales 
now applicable to the law of negligence."). 
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In summary, recovery against blood banks is based upon positive 
law. The majority view adheres to the Perlmutter codification thereby 
effectively immunizing the blood banking industry. The minority ap-
proach precludes warranty and strict liability recovery only if the virus or 
defect in the blood cannot be detected by a scientifically validated test. 
The minority approach, namely the positive-tort theory, properly bal-
ances the two conflicting interests involved in transfusion-associated vi-
rus litigations, i.e., the need for an adequate and ready supply of blood 
which might be jeopardized if blood banks were to be liable for non-
detectible defects, and the need to protect the individual's right to re-
cover from tainted blood. If a defect is non-detectible, the need to pro-
tect blood banks from court judgments and thus guarantee an adequate 
supply of blood outweighs the small risk of a few transfusion-associated 
victims. But, if a defect is detectible, then public policy favors the indi-
vidual's right to recovery for that detectible defect. Such individual re-
coveries would encourage the use of detectibility tests and thus result in a 
safer blood supply. 
VII. TRANSFUSION-ASSOCIATED AIDS: RECOVERY 
UNDER TODA Y'S LAW 
AIDS has a detectibility rate of between 97.3% and 98.6% under 
the ELISA test. 109 When the ELISA test is coupled with the Western 
blot analysis, the effective detectibility rate is 100% for AIDS antibo-
dies. 110 Although it is true that a positive reaction under these tests does 
not show conclusively that an individual has AIDS, it does show that an 
individual has been exposed to AIDS antibodies and as such provides a 
sufficient basis to reject the blood for transfusion purposes. 111 Unlike the 
blood tests for serum hepatitis which were ineffective, the AIDS blood 
tests are very effective and, as a result, should afford transfusion-associ-
ated AIDS' victims with excellent chances of recovery against blood 
banks. 
Whether a plaintiff will be able to recover against a blood bank for a 
case of transfusion-associated AIDS will be determined by the applicable 
law of each respective jurisdiction. Where the applicable law mirrors the 
Perlmutter decision, recovery will be unlikely. Where, however, the ap-
plicable law mirrors the positive-tort theory, recovery will be possible. 
Illustrative of the statutes which mirror Perlmutter is the California 
blood immunity statute. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole 
blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the 
purpose of . . . transfusing the same . . . into the human body 
shall be construed to be, and is declared to be, for all purposes 
109. See supra note 36. 
110. See supra note 37. 
111. See supra note 32. 
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whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every person, 
firm, or corporation participating therein, and shall not be con-
strued to be . . . , a sale of such whole blood, plasma, blood 
products, or blood derivatives for any purpose or purposes 
whatsoever. 112 
101 
Because blood is, by statutory definition, a service, warranty liability is 
inapposite as the basis of recovery for transfusion-associated AIDS. Fur-
thermore, the California statute has been interpreted to preclude strict 
liability recovery. 113 Therefore, a victim of transfusion-associated AIDS 
in California will have to rely on a cause of action founded in negligence 
to recover for damages. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although inapplicable in earlier 
transfusion-associated serum hepatitis cases, 114 should be allowed to op-
erate for a plaintiff in a transfusion-associated AIDS case. The reason for 
its disallowance in the serum hepatitis cases- serum hepatitis being un-
detectible and thus no presumption of negligence could be drawn from 
the release of tainted blood from the blood bank - is not present in 
transfusion-associated AIDS suits. AIDS is scientifically detectible and 
thus a presumption that the blood bank was negligent can be drawn from 
the fact that AIDS tainted blood was released from the blood bank for a 
transfusion. That presumption is that the blood bank negligently admin-
istered the AIDS detection tests, or failed to use the tests at all. 
However, as evidenced in a recent Californi~ case, the fact that 
AIDS was detectible in blood was outweighed by the public policy ideals 
imbued in the California blood immunity statute. In Hyland Therapuet-
ics v. Superior Court, 115 the heirs and widow of a hemophiliac brought 
suit against plasma manufacturers for a fatal case of AIDS contracted by 
the hemophiliac as a result of defendant-manufacturers' blood derived 
product. 116 The court took notice of the fact that AIDS is detectible 
through testing. 117 However, the court held that a plain reading of the 
California statute expressed a legislative intent that the protection of the 
blood supply was of the utmost importance, and that the plaintiffs should 
address their arguments to the California legislature. 118 Hence, this case 
seems to suggest that, at least in California, the detectibility of AIDS in 
human blood will not allow for a recovery because the policy of protect-
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 1606 (West 1979 & Supp. 1986). 
113. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App.3d 866, 133 
Cal. Rptr. 444 (1976); Klaus v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n Blood Bank, 
Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976); Shepard v. Alexian Brothers 
Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App.3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973). 
114. For infonnation relative to the fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inappli-
cable in transfusion-associated serum hepatitis case see supra notes 102-103 and ac-
companying text. 
115. 175 Cal. App.3d 509~ 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985). 
116. 175 Cal. App.3d at 511-12, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 591. 
117. 175 Cal. App:3d at 513, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 591. 
118. 175 Cal. App.3d at 514, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 593. 
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ing an adequate blood supply greatly outweighs the rights of individual 
victims of transfusion-assoCiated AIDS. 
The main problem with the Perlmutter codifications like that en-
acted in California is that they were enacted in response to the once un-
detectible virus of serum hepatitis. Because serum hepatitis was 
undetectible, the courts employed the service definition to shield the 
blood industry from the dangers of warranty and strict liability recov-
eries. The legislatures essentially codified Perlmutter in response to the 
judicial trends recognizing that blood was a product, and holding the 
blood industry liable under warranty and strict liability. The AIDS vi-
rus, however, is detectible in human blood. To permit the scope of anti-
quated statutes to quell recovery in transfusion-associated AIDS cases is 
irresponsible and dangerous. This is because public policy requires that 
blood banks utilize effective detection methods to ensure a safe blood 
supply. Because blood is a product, the allowance of warranty and strict 
liability recovery for victims of transfusion-associated AIDS would en-
courage blood banks to utilize modem detection methods for all detecti-
ble viruses and thus create a safer blood supply. 
Not all blood immunity statutes have the harsh effect of the Perf-
mutter-type statutes. Some statutes permit a plaintiff to recover for a 
transfused blood defect where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
blood defect was detectible. The Florida blood immunity statute permits 
such a recovery. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of 
whole blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for 
the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same, or any of 
them, into the human body for any purpose whatsoever is de-
clared to be the rendering of a service by any person participat-
ing therein and does not constitute a sale, whether or not any 
consideration is given therefore, and the implied wa"anties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose shall not be 
applicable as to a defect that cannot be detected or removed by 
reasonable use of scientific procedures or techniques. 119 
Although the Florida statute resembles the Per/mutter-type statutes in 
that it defines the sale of blood as a service, the statute contains a detec-
tibility mediated trigger that allows for the invocation of warranty liabil-
ity. Such warranty recovery is, however, contingent on whether the 
alleged transfused blood defect can be detected or removed reasonably by 
scientific means. Because AIDS is reasonably and scientifically detecti-
ble, warranty recovery under the positive-tort theory will be available to 
a transfusion-associated AIDS' victim. 120 A Florida plaintiff merely 
119. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). 
120. See supra notes 36-37 for scientific detectibility of AIDS. See Smith, Racing to Sell 
an AIDS Test to Blood Banks, BUSINESS WEEK, at 136 (Feb. 18, 1985) (where the 
reasonableness of the test is discussed. That is, each test will cost between $2 and $3 
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need prove that the ELISA test, when coupled with the Western blot 
analysis, provides an effective detection of AIDS in human blood. Be-
cause AIDS is detectible by a scientifically effective and reasonable 
means, the plaintiff would be able to assert a successful warranty action 
against the blood bank. Thus, the Florida statute, and others like it, pro-
vides a recovery based upon the positive-tort theory. Such statutes main-
tain a proper balance between an adequate supply of blood for the public 
and the rights of the individual blood transfusee. 
VIII. MARYLAND LAW 
AIDS is no longer unique to San Francisco, Miami, or New York; it 
has spread to all parts of the United States, including Maryland, Vir-
ginia, and the District of Columbia. To date, 463 AIDS cases have been 
documented in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. 121 Of 
these 463 cases, 248 AIDS victims have died. 122 Maryland has reported 
284 cases of AIDS, fifteen of which were the result of blood transfu-
sions.123 As the number of individuals who come in contact with the 
AIDS antibodies grows, the probability of more transfusion-associated 
AIDS cases also increases. To counteract the growth of AIDS in Mary-
land, former Governor Harry Hughes appointed a task force to study 
and formulate answers to the Maryland AIDS crisis. 124 In the 
meantime, however, the Maryland courts will have to consider transfu-
sion-associated AIDS cases based upon present case and positive law .125 
per blood donor.) Cf. Norton, Current Issues In Workplace Safety: AIDS PERSON-
NEL LAW UPDATE 1985 p. G-23 n.5 (Dec. 2, 1985) (the CDC has estimated that the 
average hospital stay of an AIDS victim is 170 days, resulting in costs of $147,000 
per patient. Further, the economic loss from lost earnings and premature death is 
$470,000). 
121. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1985, at D3, col.l. 
122. /d. 
123. TESTIMONY OF GILBERT M. CLARK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AMERICAN AssOCIA-
TION OF BLOOD BANKS, BEFORE THE COMMTITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, MARY-
LAND HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND, MARCH 10, 1986 at 9. 
• After this comment went to press, Maryland reported 426 AIDS cases as of Oct. 31, 
1986. Of that total, 140 were diagnosed after Jan. 1, 1986. Governor's Task Force 
on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS and Maryland, Policy Guidelines 
and Recommendations 5, 7 (Dec. 1986). 
124. Citing Rise in AIDS Cases, Hughes Names Task Force, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1985, 
at B12, col.l. The Maryland General Assembly has also reacted to the Maryland 
AIDS crisis. This is evidenced by several pre-filed bills for the 1986 session. For 
example, HB 258 would allow the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to close 
"establishments where high risk sexual activity is allowed." SB 155 would require 
the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to establish a statewide public informa-
tion program on AIDS. SB 155 was enacted into law, 1986 Md. Laws 299 to be 
codified at Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CoDE ANN. § 18-333. The AIDS crisis has also 
affected the private sector in Maryland. See Md. Morticians Set Rules for AIDS 
t Burials, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1985, at A18, col.1 (where the state board of morti-
cians ruled that funeral directors may refuse to embalm the bodies of AIDS victims, 
but they must offer immediate burial or cremation, or face a suspension or revoca-
tion of their license). 
125. The earlier nationwide discussion on blood bank liability was premised on the fact 
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At the present, there is no Maryland case law on the liability of a 
blood bank for damages that result from tainted blood used in a transfu-
sion. Presently filed in a Maryland court, however, is a case alleging 
transfusion-associated AIDS against a hospital for supplying a hemophil-
iac with blood tainted with AIDS. 126 Maryland also has reported a case 
dealing with a blood transfusion administered in a negligent fashion. 127 
that the charitable immunity doctrine had been abrogated. See supra note 3. Mary-
land, however, still adheres to a doctrine of charitable immunity. See James v. 
Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 117 (1980). Maryland has modi-
fied its doctrine, by statute, by providing that if a charitable organization has pro-
cured insurance, the insurer will be estopped from asserting the charitable immunity 
defense. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 480 (1984). Therefore, unless the Maryland 
blood bank is a commercial blood bank or a non-profit blood bank with insurance, it 
may be immune for its tainted blood. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 10.02.03(16) 
(1986) (where a "Tissue bank" is defined to include a blood bank that distributes or 
sells blood); See also MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10 §§ 10.02.01(d), 10.02.01(h) (1984) 
(repealed May 5, 1986 13:9 Md. Admin. Reg. 1030) (where prior regulations defined 
a blood bank as "any activity that procures, processes, distributes, or sells human 
blood ... " and a commercial blood bank as an "enterprise established for the pur-
pose of procuring, processing, storing, and distributing human whole blood ... for 
profit."). 
126. Wayne A. Roberts and Helen Roberts v. Surburban Hosp. Ass'n., Inc. Civil No. 
15852 (Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. filed June 27, 1986). 
* After this comment went to press, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland de-
cided Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., No. 842, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 
4, 1987) (Gilbert, C.J.). In Cheney, a hemophiliac contracted AIDS via a blood 
transfusion. The hemophiliac died, and his wife made a claim on the hemophiliac's 
accidental death insurance policy issued by Bell National Life Insurance Company. 
Slip op. at 1. The insurance policy specifically excluded payment for death resulting 
from disease. Slip op. at 3. Mrs. Cheney argued that her husband's death was acci-
dental, the accident being the use of AIDS-tainted blood for her husband's transfu-
sion. Slip op. at 5. Bell argued that Mr. Cheney died from pneumonia which was a 
direct result of the AIDS. Slip op. at 1. As such, Bell argued that Mr. Cheney's 
death was from disease and not accident. The court, per Chief Judge Gilbert, 
agreed with Bell and held that Mrs. Cheney's argument fell short "in that the re-
ceiving of the blood from [the] infected donor was not an accident." Slip op. at 5. 
The court further held that the tainted blood "was purposely drawn from the donor 
and infused into the deceased." /d. The court noted that at the time of Mr. Che-
ney's transfusion no "test was ... available to ... determine whether evidence of 
AIDS was present in [the] blood." /d. As such, Mr. Cheney's death was not acci-
dental because the hospital that administered the transfusion had no method of 
AIDS detection, and thus could not have accidently allowed AIDS-tained blood to 
be used for transfusion purposes. Because no accident could be found here, the 
court ruled that Mr. Cheney's death was by disease and thus the insurance policy 
did not apply. Slip op. at 8. From this opinion, it may be surmised that if Mr. 
Cheney received his transfusion after the availability of the AIDS detection tests 
then the Court may have found an underlying accident of death. The accident being 
the use of AIDS-tainted blood when the AIDS in that blood could have been de-
tected. If this supposition is correct, then Maryland appears to be deciding transfu-
sion-associated AIDS cases based on a judicially created "positive-tort" theory. See 
supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text for explanation of the positive-tort the-
ory. That is, the determinative factor for recovery is whether an AIDS detection 
test is available. In Cheney, the plaintiff was denied recovery because when Mr. 
Cheney . received his transfusion no AIDS detection test was available to detect 
AIDS antibodies in blood. Now that an effective AIDS detection is available, recov-
ery should be available for plaintiff's who contract AIDS from blood transfusions 
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The Maryland General Assembly, however, has enacted statutes relative 
to blood transfusion liability. 
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly reacted to the Cunning-
ham decision by enacting a blood immunity statute. 128 The Maryland 
statute has, over 15 years, undergone revision129 and amendments. 130 
The current Maryland blood immunity statute, as amended by the 1986 
General Assembly, reads as follows: 
A legally authorized person who obtains, processes, stores, dis-
tributes, or uses whole blood or any substance derived from 
blood for injection or transfusion into an individual for any 
purpose is performing a service and is not subject to: 
administered after the availability of such tests. Further, because such tests are 
available, plaintiff's who contract AIDS via blood transfusions after the availability 
of AIDS detection tests should be able to claim that their AIDS was accidentally 
contracted for insurance policy purposes. 
127. See Kyte v. McMillion, 256 Md. 85,259 A.2d 532 (1969). In this case, a unit ofRh 
positive blood was administered to a 15 year old girl injured in an automobile acci-
dent. The attending physician had ordered that the girl be transfused with Rh nega-
tive blood. Prior to a jury verdict, a settlement between the parties was reached. 
The main issue of the case dealt with the settlement agreement and its applicability 
to the joint tort-feasors involved. 
128. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 136B (1980). The fact that the Maryland blood immu-
nity statute was a reaction to Cunningham is based upon the following deductions 
as the committee reports for the bill do not exist. 
(1) The lllinois Supreme Court's decision in Cunningham expanding war-
ranty and strict liability to the entire blood industry was rendered on September 29, 
1970, with a rehearing denied on December 3, 1970. See supra note 69. 
(2) 1971 saw a proliferation of blood immunity statutes. See AIDS Suits Fo-
cus on Blood Safeguards, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 20, 1984, § 2, at 17, col.1 
("these state laws [blood immunity statutes] were passed during the 1970's in re-
sponse to the transmission of . . . hepatitis [ ] through blood transfusions."). 
(3) The pre-filed Maryland Blood Immunity Statute read as a codification of 
Perlmutter. See infra notes 161-162 and the accompanying text for the wording of 
the pre-filed bill. 
(4) The Maryland blood immunity statute was introduced in the first General 
Assembly Session after Cunningham. See 1971 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 515. 
(5) The bill was signed into law by Governor Mandel on May 24, 1971. See 
1971 Md. Laws 717. 
Therefore, it is fairly apparent from the bills original wording, its introduction 
in the first legislative session following Cunningham, and its immediate passage that 
this bill was Maryland's reaction to Cunningham. This conclusion is further but-
tressed by the fact that Maryland had no blood immunity statute prior to the Cun-
ningham decision. 
129. In 1982, the health provisions of the Maryland Code were subject to revision. As 
part of the revision process, the Maryland blood immunity statute was reorganized 
and reworded. According to the Revisor's Note of that Statute, the blood immunity 
statute, after the 1982 revision, consisted of "new language derived without substan-
tive change" from the former blood immunity statute. Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CoDE 
ANN. § 18-402 (1982) (Revisor's Note). See also 1982 Md. Laws 21, § 2. 
130. In the 1986 Legislative Session, the Maryland General Assembly amended the blood 
immunity statute to expressly label blood as a service, and thus adopt Perlmutter. 
Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (Supp. 1986) See also 1986 Md. Laws 
259. 
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(1) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness. 131 
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The 1986 Maryland General Assembly, therefore, defined blood to be a 
service, and thus embraced the Perlmutter rationale. In so doing, the 
Maryland General Assembly has denied the victims of all transfusion-
associated diseases, including AIDS, the use of strict liability and war-
ranty theories as grounds upon which to sue blood banks. Victims of 
transfusion-associated diseases who contract such diseases via blood 
transfusions administered after July 1, 1986, the effective date of the 1986 
amendments, 132 will be relegated to suits grounded in negligence. Be-
cause a negligence case against a blood bank for a transfused defect is 
almost impossible to win, the Maryland General Assembly effectively has 
immunized the Maryland blood banking industry from liability. 133 In 
taking this action, the Maryland General Assembly has tipped the bal-
ance in favor of society's need for an adequate blood supply against the 
individual's right to recover for a transfused defect. Hence, the newly 
amended Maryland blood immunity statute effectively will foreclose re-
covery for victims of transfusion-associated AIDS whose AIDS is con-
tracted via a blood transfusion administered after July 1, 1986. 
The newly amended Maryland blood immunity statute is prospec-
tive only and will not foreclose blood bank liability for AIDS cases that 
result from blood transfusions administered prior to July 1, 1986. 134 
131. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.§ 18-402 (Stipp. 1986). The following amendment 
to Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.§ 18-402 (1982 & Supp. 1986) was introduced 
in the 1987 Session of the Maryland General Assembly: 
A legally authorized person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or 
uses whole human blood, tissue, organs, or bones or any substance derived 
from human blood, tissue, organs, or bones for injection, transfusion, or 
transplantation into an individual for any purpose is performing a service 
and not subject to: 
( 1) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness. 
If enacted, the Perlmutter rationale will be applicable not only to blood, but also to 
human tissue, organs, and bones. 
132. 1986 Md. Laws 259, § 2. See also Mo. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.§ 18-402 (Supp. 
1986) (Revisor's Note). 
133. The statute, of course, does not relieve a blood bank from its liability for intentional 
infliction of harm causes of action. For discussion of negligence as a cause of action 
in transfusion-associated suits, see supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. 
134. Statutes enacted in Maryland are presumed to be prospective, unless the language of 
the statute is shown to have a retroactive intent. Dallam v. Olivers Ex'rs, 3 Gill. 
445 (1845); Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 267 Md. 
389, 297 A.2d 745 (1972); Maryland Classified Employee Ass'n v. Anderson, 281 
Md. 496, 380 A.2d 1032 (1977). Amendatory acts take effect, like any other legisla-
tive enactments, only from the time of their passage and have no application to prior 
transactions or occurrences, unless an express or implied retroactive intent can be 
drawn from the amendment. State Tax Comm. v. Pepco, 182 Md. Ill, 32 A.2d 383 
(1943). The 1986 amendments exhibit no retroactive intent, either express or im-
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Such cases will be governed by the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity 
statute. 135 As such, an examination of the Maryland blood immunity 
statute prior to the 1986 amendments is of importance. 
The Maryland blood immunity statute, prior to the 1986 Amend-
ments, read as follows: 
A person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses 
whole blood or any substance derived from blood for injection 
or transfusion into an individual for any purpose may not be 
held liable for the virus of serum hepatitis under: 
(1) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness. 136 
Although the Maryland courts never had occasion to construe this stat-
ute, the Court of Appeals of Maryland took notice of the statute's exist-
ence in a case unrelated to blood transfusions. 137 How the Maryland 
courts will construe this statute in a case of transfusion-associated AIDS 
resulting from a transfusion administered prior to July 1, 1986 will hinge 
upon the court's determination of the statute's legislative intent. The 
Maryland courts utilize a six-part analysis in ascertaining legislative 
intent. 138 
plied, as the amendments were stated to become effective on July 1, 1986. See supra 
note 132. 
135. For the fact that there are individuals who contracted AIDS via blood transfusions 
prior to the effective date of the 1986 Amendments to the Maryland blood immu-
nity statute, see supra note 123 and accompanying text. Although only 15 individu-
als have contracted AIDS via pre-July 1, 1986 transfusions, many other pre-July 1, 
1986 blood transfusees may later contract AIDS as the AIDS antibodies could have 
been infused into their blood and can remain dormant for many years. See, e.g., 
Life Skills Education, AIDS and the Heterosexual Community at 2 (1986) (AIDS 
can remain dormant in a body for two to five years); American Council on Science 
and Health, Answers About AIDS at 23 (1986) ("researchers estimated that the true 
average incubation period for transfusion-associated AIDS will be four and one-half 
to five and one-half years, with a possible upper limit of 14 years."); M Irwin, AIDS 
fears and facts at S (1986) ("For transfusion-related AIDS, the incubation period is 
believed to range from 4 to 62 months.") See also Cheney v. Bell Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 
No. 842, slip op. at 3 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 4, 1987) ("The incubation period 
for AIDS 'may be two and one-half to five years or more. Indeed some researchers 
believe that there is no real maximum incubation period-that is, an infected person 
may develop symptoms at any time during his or her life.' " citing Hammett, AIDS 
in Co"ectional Facilities: Issues and Options at 6 (U.S. Dept. of Justice Apr. 1986). 
The CDC has alerted doctors to administer AIDS blood detection tests to patients 
who received blood transfusions between 1978 and late spring of 1985. Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection In Transfusion Recipients and Their Family 
Members, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, March 20, 1987, at 
139. The screening of these patients probably will result in more transfusion-associ-
ated cases, thus, making the examination of the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity 
statute more relevant; 
136. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1982) (emphasis added). 
137. Burton v. Artery Co., Inc. 279 Md. 94, 103 n.l, 367 A.2d 935, 941 n.l (1977). 
138. Montgomery County v. Lindsey, 50 Md. App. 675, 678, 440 A.2d 411, 413 (1982). 
108 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
The cardinal rule of Maryland statutory construction is to ascertain 
and effectuate the actual intent of the General Assembly. 139 To accom-
plish the fulfillment of the cardinal rule, a court first seeks the legislative 
intent of a statute by examining the words of the statute - the plain 
meaning rule. 140 The second part of gaining the legislative intent of a 
statute consists of construing the statute so as to effectuate its objective or 
purpose based upon the statute's plain meaning. 141 Third, a statute with 
various provisions is to be construed to give meaningful effect to all of its 
parts. 142 Fourth, Maryland courts adhere to the basic adage of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius - the expression of a specific term will exclude 
all others. 143 A court may not, according to the fifth element, disregard 
the natural import of the statutory language, unless some imperative rea-
son is found in the statute for enlarging or restricting its meaning. 144 
Finally, when a statute is plain, free of ambiguity, and expresses a definite 
and sensible meaning a court is not at liberty to insert or delete words 
with a view towards making the statute express an intention that is differ-
ent from the plain meaning. 145 If a statute is ambiguous or of doubtful 
meaning, a court may employ the use of extrinsic aids, such as the his-
tory of the statute's passage, committee reports, and testimony before 
committee, to ascertain legislative intent. 146 
Applying the above rules of statutory construction to the former 
Maryland blood immunity statute yields a construction that denies the 
use of implied warranties147 and strict liability148 against a blood bank 
that "obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses whole blood ... for 
. . . transfusion . . . " purposes if and only if the transfusion in question 
results in a case of transfusion-associated serum hepatitis. 149 Since the 
former statute expressly applies to serum hepatitis, it does not preclude 
the application of implied warranties or strict liability in cases involving 
other transfused impurities, such as AIDS. 150 Therefore, the former 
blood immunity statute will not bar a transfusion-associated AIDS suit 
139. Penn. Nat. Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 
(1980). 
140. Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 400 A.2d 1091 (1979). 
141. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 348 A.2d 275 (1975), on remand, 30 Md. App. 1, 351 
A.2d 477, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976). 
142. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 353 A.2d 256 (1976). 
143. Thanhauser v. Savins, 44 Md. 410 (1876); more recently Miller v. Forty West Build-
ers, Inc., 62 Md. App. 320, 489 A.2d 76 (1985). 
144. Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. States Attorney for Prince George's County, 267 Md. 
501, 298 A.2d 427 (1973). 
145. /d. See also Gatewood v. State, 244 Md. 609, 224 A.2d 677 (1966). 
146. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982). 
147. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 2-314 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (Maryland's statute for 
implied warranty and implied warranty of merchantability). 
148. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (where 
Maryland adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A). 
149. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-402 (1982). 
150. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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where a plaintiff alleges that the AIDS was contracted from a blood 
transfusion administered prior to July 1, 1986. 
Even though the former blood immunity statute does not preclude a 
transfusion-associated AIDS suit, it remains uncertain whether a Mary-
land court would classify blood as a sale or service under the pre-1986 
statute. There is no Maryland law in point. However, the framework of 
analysis for deciding whether blood is a sale or service has been provided 
for in a Maryland case. 
The Maryland case which enunciated the analytical framework is 
Burton v. Artery Co., Inc. 151 The issue in Burton was whether the general 
three year statute of limitations or the four year Uniform Commercial 
Code statute of limitations applied to a contract for the sale and installa-
tion of trees and shrubs. 152 The court concluded that the four year stat-
ute of limitations applied. 153 In so concluding, the court held that the 
contract was one of a mixed sales/service nature, and that the sales na-
ture of the contract predominated. 154 In deciding this, the court adopted 
the Bonebrake test for determining the predominate nature of a mixed 
sales/service contract. 155 The Burton court stated the Bonebrake test as: 
[N]ot whether [the sales/service components] are mixed, but, 
granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant fac-
tor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendi-
tion of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract 
with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor 
incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a 
bathroom). 156 
Hence, the Maryland test of whether a mixed contract is predominantly 
a service or sales contract is the Bonebrake analysis. 
Of importance in Burton is the court's extensive discussion of sales/ 
service contracts in other jurisdictions. The court examined such situa-
tions as food served in restaurants, 157 purchase and installation of certain 
materials during the construction of a home, 158 and contracts for wed-
ding photographs to name a few. 159 Included in the court's discussion of 
sales/service contracts is an at length discussion of blood transfusion 
cases from other jurisdictions. 160 Although this discussion is dicta, it 
suggests very strongly that the Court of Appeals of Maryland would ap-
ply the Bonebrake test in a suit alleging transfusion-associated AIDS 
151. 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977). 
152. 279 Md. at 95, 367 A.2d at 936. 
153. 279 Md. at 115, 367 A.2d at 946. 
154. 279 Md. at 114-15, 367 A.2d at 946. 
155. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974). 
156. 279 Md. at 108-9, 367 A.2d at 943. 
157. 279 Md. at 103-4, 367 A.2d at 9~.0. 
158. 279 Md. at 105-6, 367 A.2d at 941. 
159. 279 Md. at 113, 367 A.2d at 945. 
160. 279 Md. at 102-4, 110-11, 367 A.2d at 939-41, 944. 
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where AIDS contraction resulted from a transfusion administered prior 
to July 1, 1986, to determine the predominating factor of the blood trans-
fusion, which Burton characterizes as a mixed sales/service contract. 
The application of the Bonebrake analysis in a pre-July 1, 1986, 
transfusion-associated AIDS case would engender in Maryland the entire 
Perlmutter controversy of whether blood is to be defined as a sale or 
service. The Bonebrake test would, in a pre-July 1, 1986, transfusion-
associated virus case not concerning serum hepatitis, resurrect the entire 
Perlmutter line of cases dealing with the sales/service dichotomy. 
It seems, however, that the Perlmutter controversy can be avoided 
in a pre-July 1, 1986, transfusion-associated AIDS case if one examines, 
closely, the legislative history of the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity 
statute. In 1971, Delegate Menes pre-filed House Bill Number 761 -
the precursor of the later enacted Maryland blood immunity statute. 161 
House Bill Number 761 read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Neither strict liability in tort nor the implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness shall be applicable to the procure-
ment, processing, storage, distribution, and/or use of whole 
blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the 
use of injecting or transfusing the same or any of them into the 
human body for any purpose whatsoever. Such procurement, 
processing, storage, distribution, and/or use constitutes the 
rendering of a service by every person, firm, or corporation par-
ticipating therein, whether or not any remuneration is paid 
therefor, and does not constitute a sale. 162 
Hence, the initial draft of the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity statute 
rejected the Cunningham and Community Blood Bank decisions, and em-
braced the Perlmutter decision. On March 3, 1971, the bill was referred 
to the House Committee on Environmental Matters. 163 In Committee, 
the bill was amended by the addition of the introductory phrase "as to 
the virus of serum hepatitis." 164 This amendment supports the earlier 
conclusion that the General Assembly's express intention was that the 
bill was to apply exclusively to transfusion-associated serum hepatitis 
cases. The amendment was adopted, and on March 27, 1971, the House 
of Delegates passed the bill by a vote of 95-13 and then referred the bill 
to the Maryland Senate.I65 
In the Senate, the bill was significantly amended by the striking of 
the language "designating it [blood) as a service and not sale" from the 
161. MARYLAND HOUSE PRE-FILED BILLS, 1971 Session, Bill No. 761. 
162. /d. 
163. 1971 JOURNAL .OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 515. See gener-
ally MD. CONST. art. 2, § 17, art. 3, §§ 27-31 (for process by which a bill becomes a 
law in Maryland). 
164. 1971 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1268. 
165. 1971 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1427-28. 
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bill's title, 166 and striking from the purview the language: "Such pro-
curement, processing, storage, distribution, and/or use constitutes the 
rendering of a service by every person, firm or corporation participating 
therein, whether or not any remuneration is paid therefor, and does not 
constitute a sale." 167 The House of Delegates adopted the Senate amend-
ments by a vote of 89-2, and referred the enrolled bill to the governor for 
his approval. 168 
On May 24, 1971, Governor Marvin Mandel signed the enrolled bill 
into law to become effective July 1, 1971. 169 The enacted statute read, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
As to the virus of serum hepatitis, neither strict liability in tort 
nor the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall 
be applicable to the procurement, processing, storage, distribu-
tion, and/or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products, and 
blood derivatives for the use of injecting or transfusing the 
same or any of them into the human body for any purpose 
whatsoever. 170 
The Maryland General Assembly revised the statute in 1982, but the re-
vision was only in language and not in the substantive reach of the 
law.t7t 
The changes between the pre-filed bill and the enacted statute are 
significant. The most significant is the express rejection of the service 
categorization of blood as advocated by Perlmutter. The General Assem-
bly's rejection of the PeT-/mutter rationale can. be interpreted as an im-
plicit recognition that blood is indeed a product and thus a sale. This 
interpretation provides strong support for the notion that Maryland 
courts would define blood as a sale and not a service in a pre-July 1, 
1986, transfusion-associated AIDS suit. Therefore, the legislative history 
of the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity statute voids the Perlmutter 
decision in Maryland because the General Assembly addressed Perlmut-
ter's rationale, and rejected it. 
A plaintiff alleging transfusion-associated AIDS as a result of 
166. The title to Bill No. 761 originally read: 
"AN ACT to add new section 136B to Article 43 of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland (1965 Replacement Volume and 1970 Supplement), title 
"Health", subtitle "Practitioners of Medicine," to follow immediately af-
ter Section 136A thereof, relating to the procurement, processing, storage, 
distribution and/or use of blood and blood derivatives for transfusions and 
designating it as a service, and not a sale, to which no implied warranties of 
merchantability or fitness attach, nor to which strict tort liability applies." 
(emphasis added) MARYLAND HOUSE PRE-FILED BILLS, 1971 Session, 
Bill No. 761. 
167. 1971 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2462-63. 
168. Jd. 
169. 1971 Md. Laws 717. 
170. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 136B (1980). 
171. 1982 Md. Laws 21. See also MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.§ 18-402 (1982) (Re-
visor's Note). 
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tainted blood received from a Maryland blood bank prior to July 1, 1986, 
will not, therefore, be barred from a suit grounded in warranty and strict 
liability by the pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity statute. As such, the 
issues at such a trial will revolve around when the plaintiff received the 
blood transfusion, as the test for AIDS detection in blood was not made 
available to blood banks until March 2, 1985. 172 If the plaintiff's blood 
transfusion which resulted in AIDS was administered prior to the availa-
bility of the AIDS detection test, then the blood bank, absent any negli-
gence and intentional infliction of wilful harm, should not be held liable 
for the plaintiff's case of AIDS because the blood bank could not scientif-
ically detect the AIDS in the blood. 173 To hold the blood bank liable for 
the scientifically undetectible defect would be inapposite to the public 
policy of providing society with an adequate supply of blood. Such liabil-
ity in an undetectible blood defect situation possibly could lead to large 
adverse judgments which would force blood banks out of business, jeop-
ardizing all of society. 
If, however, the AIDS victim contracted AIDS via a blood transfu-
sion after March 2, 1985, and prior to July 1, 1986, then such a victim 
should be permitted to utilize warranty and strict liability theories 
against the blood bank that supplied the blood. This is so because the 
blood bank had available to it an AIDS detection test. As such, the 
AIDS in the blood was detectible, and thus the defective blood should 
not have been supplied for blood transfusion purposes. Therefore, public 
policy would favor the use of warranty and strict liability theories here as 
such theories allow for the plaintiff to recover. Individual recovery is 
favored in a detectible defect situation so as to force blood banks to util-
ize all reasonable detection methods so as to further a safer blood 
supply. 
Therefore, in a suit alleging pre-July 1, 1986 transfusion-associated 
AIDS, the rationale of the positive-tort theory should be determinative in 
Maryland. That is, if the AIDS was contracted via blood transfusion 
prior to March 2, 1985, then the plaintiff should not be able to utilize 
warranty and strict liability theories as a basis of recovery because the 
AIDS was undetectible by the blood bank prior to March 2, 1985. How-
ever, if the AIDS was contracted via blood transfusion after March 2, 
1985, and prior to July 1, 1986, then the plaintiff should be able to utilize 
warranty and strict liability theories as a basis of recovery because the 
AIDS was scientifically detectible in the blood. 
It was, however, because of the possible blood bank liability for 
172. 2,500 Blood Recipients Urged to Take AIDS Test, Wash. Post, June 7, 1986, at AS, 
col.3. See also H.H.S. News, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
March 4, 1985. 
173. The case of Wayne A. Roberts and Helen Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n., Inc., 
Civil No. 15852 (Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. filed June 27, 1986), would fall into this cate-
gory because the plaintiff's complaint states that the plaintiff was diagnosed with 
AIDS in February of 1985. See plaintiff's complaint at~ 4. 
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transfusion-associated AIDS that the 1986 Maryland General Assembly 
amended its blood immunity statute to embrace the Perlmutter rationale. 
The 1986 amendments were introduced by Delegate Ellen R. Sauerbrey 
on February 5, 1986."4 Delegate Sauerbrey introduced the bill at the 
request of the Maryland Chapter of the American Red Cross. 175 The 
reason for the bill's introduction was to close the loophole in the Mary-
land blood immunity statute which would permit an individual to sue a 
blood bank for a case of transfusion-associated AIDS. 176 Delegate Sauer-
brey stated that because Maryland blood banks would be susceptible to 
transfusion-associated AIDS law suits, "the Red Cross was forced to se-
riously consider discontinuing [its] blood program in Maryland."177 Be-
cause of this fear, the 1986 Maryland General Assembly amended the 
Maryland blood immunity statute by resorting to the Perlmutter ration-
ale which the 1971 Maryland General Assembly implicitly had re-
jected. 178 By resorting to the Perlmutter rationale to amend the blood 
immunity statute, the 1986 General Assembly adopted a 1954 legalism 
which favors society's need for an adequate, but not wholly safe, blood 
supply while disregarding an individual's right to recover for a detectible 
defect in blood. 
The pre-1986 Maryland blood immunity statute was in need of 
amendment because it only applied to serum hepatitis and thus permitted 
warranty and strict liability suits for all other defects, detectible or not. 
The 1986 Maryland General Assembly should have, however, amended 
the statute with a policy rationale instead of the Perlmutter service ra-
tionale. That is, the General Assembly should have denied the use of 
warranty and strict liability in non-detectible blood defect situations so as 
to further the societal need of an adequate blood supply. But where a 
blood defect is detectible, the General Assembly should have permitted 
the use of warranty and strict liability so as to further the rights of indi-
viduals and also to further a safer blood supply. In so doing, the Mary-
land General Assembly would have enacted the positive-tort theory and 
also would have announced a policy that balances society's need for an 
adequate blood supply and an individual's right to recover for a detecti-
174. Maryland House of Delegates- House Bill No. 1629, 1986 General Session. The 
"first reader" of that bill read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"A person who obtains, processes, stores, distributes, or uses whole blood 
or any substance derived from blood for injection or transfusion into an 
individual for any purpose is performing a service and is not subject to: 
(l) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness." 
Bill No. 1629 was latt' amended to its present language, supra note 131 and accom-
panying text, and enacted into law on April 29, 1986. 1986 Md. Laws 259. 
175. Letter from Delegate Sauerbrey to the author dated October 21, 1986. 
176. /d. See also TESTIMONY OF GILBERT M. CLARK, supra note 122; letter from the 
American Red Cross, Baltimore Regional Chapter to Delegate Jerry E. Perry, dated 
March 6, 1986 and introduced as the Testimony of the American Red Cross. 
177. Letter from Delegate Sauerbrey to the author dated October 21, 1986. 
178. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text. 
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ble blood defect, with the resulting policy leading to a safer and adequate 
blood supply. Therefore, the Maryland General Assembly should retreat 
from the 1986 amendments by repealing them. In their stead, the Mary-
land General Assembly should enact a blood immunity statute that em-
brances the positive-tort theory.t79 
IX. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION 
The law of blood bank liability essentially has been the struggle be-
tween two conflicting policies - the societal need for an adequate blood 
supply versus an individual's right to recover for transfusion-associated 
diseases. Generally, the individual's right to recovery was outweighed by 
the societal need for an adequate blood supply. The rationale behind the 
policy decision favoring society's need for blood was founded in the fact 
that blood defects were undetectible. Because the blood banks could not 
detect the defects in the blood, society deemed it important to immunize 
blood banks from potential business-busting court judgments in order to 
protect society's interest in an adequate and unimpeded blood supply. 180 
The above mentioned struggle has been influenced and dealt with by 
the courts and legislatures. The courts were the first to set a policy of 
favoritism in this struggle. The courts created a fiction that defined 
blood as a "service" to which no warranty or strict liability recovery 
could attach. The courts created this fiction in the realm of transfusion-
associated serum hepatitis litigation because serum hepatitis was un-
detectible in human blood, and thus the blood industry needed to be pro-
tected. But as time passed and more courts began to consider 
transfusion-associated litigation, the courts began to reexamine the quix-
otic logic that blood was a service. Upon this re-examination, courts be-
gan to recognize the true role of blood banks - product suppliers - and 
began to permit warranty and strict liability recovery against the blood 
banks. The courts' adjustment of the struggle between society's need for 
blood versus an individual's right for recovery reached its zenith in favor 
of the individual when the Cunningham court held that hospitals and 
blood banks could be liable in warranty and strict liability for transfu-
sion-associated defects. Hence, sixteen years after Perlmutter, the courts 
had totally rebalanced the struggle in the favor of the individual's right 
to recover for transfusion-associated defects. 
At this juncture in the blood bank liability history, the legislatures 
179. The author drafted, and respectfully submits these bills for the purpose of enacting 
the "positive-tort" theory in Maryland. See Appendix. 
180. Society's need for an adequate and unimpeded blood supply was recently reasserted 
in Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc., 500 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1987). In 
Rasmussen, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the estate of a man who died of 
AIDS had no right to obtain the names of blood donors who donated the blood used 
for the man's transfusion after an automobile accident. The Court held that it was 
important for society to have a reliable blood supply, and any breach of blood donor 
confidentiality could discourage blood donations and thus jeopardize a reliable sup-
ply of blood. 
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sought to reset the balance in favor of the societal need for an adequate 
blood supply. The legislatures accomplished this task by retreating to 
the Perlmutter fiction that blood was a service to which no warranty or 
strict liability could attach as a basis for recovery. A majority of these 
antiquated blood immunity statutes will have the present day effect of 
barring warranty and strict liability recovery for victims of transfusion-
associated AIDS. 181 Hence, a majority of the states will only afford vic-
tims of transfusion-associated AIDS with negligence actions. Since these 
actions are generally unsuccessful against blood banks, these Perlmutter 
codifications essentially will bar transfusion-associated AIDS suits and 
thus immunize the blood banking industry. 
A few states, however, have abandoned the strict Perlmutter codifi-
cations which immunize the blood industry. These states have enacted 
statutes that recognize and balance the competing policies of society's 
need for an adequate blood supply versus an individual's right to recover 
for a transfusion-associated defect. These states follow the positive-tort 
theory whereby an individual is permitted warranty and strict liability 
recovery for a detectible defect in human blood, but is denied warranty 
and strict liability recovery for a non-detectible defect. This approach, 
the positive-tort theory, results in a safer blood supply in that warranty 
and strict liability recovery for detectible defects will force blood banks 
to utilize detection tests to avoid law suits and their potential business-
busting judgments. The societal need for an adequate blood supply is 
maintained in nondetectible blood defect situations. because, in effect, a 
transfusee of blood who contracts a disease because of the non-detectible 
defect will be deemed to have consented to the risk prior to the transfu-
sion.182 Because the positive-tort theory balances the two conflicting pol-
icies in such a way that the ultimate result is a safer blood supply, the 
positive-tort theory is the solution for handling transfusion-associated de-
fect litigations. 
Because blood bank liability is governed by positive law, the courts 
181. See Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App.3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 
590 (1985) (a hemophiliac contracted AIDS from a blood clotting factor tainted 
with AIDS. The hemophiliac died and his heirs brought an action in strict liability 
against the manufacturer of the blood clotting factor. While the California court 
noted that AIDS was detectible, the court held that the California Per/mutter-type 
statute barred a strict liability claim because blood was classified as a service.). 
182. In this situation, a doctor that prescribes the blood transfusion may be liable under 
the informed consent doctrine as enunciated in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). Such claims, however, have not 
been successful in transfusion-associated serum hepatitis cases. See Sawyer v. Meth-
odist Hosp. of Memphis, 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1102 
(6th Cir. 1975) (likelihood of contracting serum hepatitis by a blood transfusion was 
.013%, and thus the physician was under no duty to inform the patient of such a 
small risk); Moore v. Underwood Memorial Hosp., 147 N.J. Super. 252, 371 A.2d 
105 (1977) (plaintiff did not demonstrate a local standard that the physician was 
under a duty to issue a warning that a transfusion could result in serum hepatitis). 
Maryland acknowledges an informed consent cause of action. See Sard v. Hardy, 
281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). 
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cannot enact the positive-tort theory by way of opinion. The legislatures 
will have to enact the positive-tort theory by way of statutes. Therefore, 
the state legislatures that have not already done so should adopt the posi-
tive-tort theory relative to blood bank liability law. In so doing, the legis-
latures will be balancing the two conflicting policies of blood litigations 
in such a manner that an adequate supply of safe blood will be main-
tained, while simultaneously ensuring that individuals receiving tainted 
blood in blood transfusions will have the right to recover for injuries 
caused by detectible defects in that blood. 
Under present law, victims of transfusion-associated AIDS will find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to recover against blood banks for their 
transfused AIDS in a majority of states. However, in those states that 
adhere to the positive-tort theory, victims of transfusion-associated 
AIDS will be permitted to use warranty and strict liability theories 
against blood banks. The use of these theories generally will lead to vic-
tim recovery because AIDS is a detectible blood defect. While those 
states that adhere to the positive-tort theory are permitting victim recov-
ery, they are also fostering a safer blood supply because blood banks will 
utilize all scientific tests to detect blood defects in order to avoid liability. 
Hence, those states with Perlmutter codification should repeal their 
codifications. In their stead, those states, including Maryland, should 
enact the positive-tort theory relative to blood bank liability. Such an 
action by the states would provide America with a uniform system of law 
resulting in an adequate and safe supply of blood nationwide. 




Blood Bank Liability 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
No.101 
Introduced and read first time: 
Assigned to: 
A BILL ENTITLED 
AN ACT concerning 
117 
Human Blood- Transfusion- Warranty and Strict Liability 
FOR the purpose of repealing warranty and strict liability immunity for 
persons who provide or sell human blood for transfusions when 
a defect in the blood causes a disease in the transfusee; provid-
ing for warranty and strict liability immunity for persons who 
provide or sell human blood for transfusions that cause disease 
in the transfusee when the defect in the blood is scientifically 
undetectible; providing for warranty and strict liability recov-
ery against persons who provide or sell human blood for trans-
fusions that cause disease in the transfusee when the defect in 
the blood is scientifically detectible; and providing for the inter-
pretation of this Act. 
BY repealing 
Article - Health - General 
Section 18-402 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1982 Volume and 1986 Supplement) 
BY adding to 
Article - Health - General 
Section 18-402 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1982 Volume and 1986 Supplement) 
Preamble 
WHEREAS, The availability of human whole blood, plasma, 
blood products, and blood derivatives is important to the health and wel-
fare of the people of Maryland; and 
WHEREAS, Blood transfusees should be protected from scien-
tifically detectible blood defects, such as Acquired Immune Deficiency 
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Syndrome (AIDS), by way of warranty and strict liability recovery for 
detectible defects that cause disease in blood transfusees; and 
WHEREAS, Blood banks and hospitals should be immune 
from warranty and strict liability recovery for blood defects that are sci-
entifically undetectible so as to further the availability of human whole 
blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives; and 
WHEREAS, A balance needs to be struck between the conflict-
ing interests of blood transfusees and blood banks so as to further the 
important public policy of blood availability; now, therefore, 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as 
follows: 
Article - Health - General 
18-402 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person 
who obtains, processes, stores, sells, or uses human blood or any sub-
stance derived from human blood for transfusion into an individual for 
any purpose may not be held liable for defects in that blood that cause 
disease in the transfusee under: 
(1) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; or 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness. 
(b) A person who obtains, processes, stores, sells, or uses human 
blood or any substance derived from human blood for transfusion into an 
individual for any purpose shall be liable for scientifically detectible de-
fects in that blood that cause disease in the transfusee under: 
(1) Strict liability in tort; 
(2) The implied warranty of merchantability; and 
(3) The implied warranty of fitness. 
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That 
this Act shall be construed only prospectively and may not be applied or 
interpreted to have any effect upon or application to any event or hap-
pening occurring prior to the effective date of this Act. 
SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That 
this Act shall take effect January 1, 19 . 
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Blood Banks- Non-Applicability of Maryland Health Care 
Malpractice Claims Act 
FOR the purpose of providing that Blood Banks are not a "Health Care 
Provider." 
BY adding to 
Article - Health - General 
Section 18-402.1 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1982 Volume and 1986 Supplement) 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL AS-
SEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as 
follows: 
Article - Health - General 
18-402.1 
A person who obtains, processes, stores, or sells human blood 
or any substance derived from human blood for transfusion into an indi-
vidual may not be deemed a "Health Care Provider." 
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That 
this Act shall take effect on January 1, 19, contingent on the taking effect 
of Chapter -- of the Acts of the General Assembly of 19 (H. B. 101 ), 
and if Chapter -- does not become effective, this Act is null and void 
without the necessity of further action by the General Assembly. 
